Subject: INVESTIGATIVE DATA WAREHOUSE
FOIPA No. 1058805-000

Dear Ms. Hofmann:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

- (b)(1)
- (b)(2)
- (b)(3)
- (b)(4)
- (b)(5)
- (b)(6)
- (b)(7)(A)
- (b)(7)(B)
- (b)(7)(C)
- (b)(7)(D)
- (b)(7)(E)
- (b)(7)(F)
- (b)(8)
- (b)(9)
- (d)(5)
- (j)(2)
- (k)(1)
- (k)(2)
- (k)(3)
- (k)(4)
- (k)(5)
- (k)(6)
- (k)(7)

134 page(s) were reviewed and 73 page(s) are being released.

- Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:
  - referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
  - referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

- You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 within sixty days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked “Freedom of Information Appeal” or “Information Appeal.” Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

- The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when iden, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s).
If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

The enclosed documents represent the second of a series of interim releases that will be made with regard to your request pertaining to the Investigative Data Warehouse.

For your information, some of the enclosed pages contain information about other subject matters. We consider this information “outside the scope” of your request, and have redacted the information and marked it “o/s”.
EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

(b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;

(b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

(b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could be reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

(b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

(b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

(d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;

(j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;

(k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;

(k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;

(k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;

(k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;

(k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.
Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts

FOIPA # 1058805

Subject: Investigative Data Warehouse

File Number: 

Section: OTD

Federal Bureau of Investigation
From: (Div00) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 2:14 PM
To: (Div00) (FBI); (Div05) (FBI);
    (Div07) (FBI); (Div11) (FBI);
    (Div13) (FBI); (Div16) (FBI);
    (Div17) (FBI);
Cc: (Div00) (FBI); (Div01) (FBI);
    (Div02) (FBI);
    (Div04) (FBI);
    (Div05) (FBI);
    (Div06) (FBI);

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS DECLASSIFIED DATE 08-27-2007 BY 65179 DHH/BAA/CAL

Page 1 of 3

1058805
On January 25, 2004, IDW 1.0 was successfully deployed providing users with access to CT/CI ECF and UNI data, IntelPlus file rooms, SAMNET, JICI scanned CT documents, open source news, and VGTOF using the retrieval tools. Training was deployed throughout the field for Field Intelligence Group personnel. To date, 485 accounts have been issued and CounterTerrorism Division has plans to request 4,200 accounts for members of the Joint Terrorism Task Force members through the field. The IDW-Integration environment was established and is ready for final security testing.
Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts

FOIPA # 1058805

Subject: Investigative Data Warehouse

File Number:

Section: OGC-A

Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Serial Description ~ COVER SHEET

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 13
Page 4 ~ b4, b5, b6, b7C
Page 32 ~ b2, b5, b6, b7C, b7E
Page 33 ~ b2, b5, b6, b7C, b7E
Page 34 ~ b2, b5, b6, b7C, b7E
Page 85 ~ b2, b6, b7C, b7E
Page 87 ~ b2, b7E
Page 109 ~ b2, b7E
Page 110 ~ b2, b7E
Page 111 ~ b2, b7E
Page 112 ~ b2, b7E
Page 113 ~ b2, b7E
Page 114 ~ b2, b7E
Page 115 ~ b2, b7E
Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts

FOIPA # 1058805

Subject: Investigative Data Warehouse

File Number:

Section: OGC-B, Section One

Federal Bureau of Investigation
UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBI Data Warehousing, Data Mining & Collaboration: An Enterprise View of Data

Public Brief

by

Ken Ritchhart,
(202) 324-7781; KRITCHHART@FBI.GOV
KRITCHHA@LEO.GOV

Section Chief, Data, Engineering & Integration
Program Management Office

May 30, 2003
OVERVIEW: WE ARE IN TRANSITION
Moving From Reactive To Proactive
Moving From Stovepipes To Enterprise

• We Are in a Dynamic New World: The Environment has Changed Radically and Things Will Be Different!

• Countering Terrorism Requires Us To Be Proactive. We Must Anticipate What May Happen And Prevent Terrorism Not Just Investigate It After The Fact.

• We Must Accelerate Our Ability To Find and React To Relevant Information. We Must Have Interoperability, Collaboration, Information Assurance, and Ready Access To All Relevant Data/ Information/ Knowledge.

• The Web, Metadata, COTS, Data Warehousing, Data Mining, Collaboration Technologies and Business Process Reengineering Will Fundamentally Transform the Way We Do Business.
FBI Priorities

1. Protect the United States from terrorist attack
2. Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage
3. Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes
4. Combat public corruption at all levels
5. Protect civil rights
6. Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises
7. Combat major white-collar crime
8. Combat significant violent crime
9. Support federal, state, municipal and international partners
10. Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI’s mission
Reengineering FBI Information Technology

Business Process Reengineering

- Major focus on reviewing what we do and how we do it to see if we can do it better, eliminate it, or combine it.
  - Over 40 major BPR project ongoing
  - Major shift in resources to Counterterrorism

- Restructuring of Information Technology in the FBI
  - New Deputy Executive Assistant Director for Information Technology
  - Major restructuring of IT & all IT acquisitions & realigning with FBI strategy
  - Professionalization IT acquisition, development & program management
  - Looking to Competitive Sourcing
  - Rapid prototyping to meet dynamic user needs
Problems with Existing Data Infrastructure

- Interfaces Cumbersome
  - Unique Application Access, Most Lack an Efficient Web Interface
- Access to Data Bases Restricted, Limited, Stove-piped. No Big Picture of All the Available Data
  - We Do Not Really Know What We Know or Who Has It
- Lack of Critical Data in the Data Bases
- Tremendous Duplication & Redundancy.
- No Ability to Digitally Sign and Secure the Data

No Access To External Sources
Where We Are Headed: An Information Enterprise

- Layered Architecture
- Separate layers to allow modular changes to architectural as well as system components
The Vision

Virtual Case File

Provides The Business logic and Processes To Enter, Change and Process Data relative to a case -- It is How We Should Do Our Job in the Future. Does Not Apply to Non-Investigative applications.

Records Management Application:

Provides central control of all FBI records in accordance with Federal Statutes & Policy. Part of the controlling function for the Data Warehouse.

Master Data Warehouse:

Stores All FBI Enterprise Data & External data to Minimize Cost and provide Enterprise Access to All our Data by all applications. Combines Data into a searchable information sphere that can be use for data mining or cross indexing without going through the legacy Applications.

-- Key to interoperability.
Building A New Infrastructure

Applications
ACS -> VCF
Query-> Data Mining
Analytical Tools

Desktop Hardware

Old ACS
Adabas

Analysis
Terrorism/Intelligence
Data

Master Virtual
Data Warehouse
ORACLE 9i

Other Law
Enforcement
Data

LAN/WAN NETWORKS
TRILOGY

Servers

Data Warehouse
Finding Drops of Information In An Ocean of Data & Connecting the Dots

Data Is In Different Formats, Different Media, Different Classifications, at Different Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FBI Phoenix Memo</th>
<th>Moussaoui Arrest</th>
<th>Suspect Traffic Violation</th>
<th>First Trade Tower Attack</th>
<th>Al Qaeda Non-Specific US Threat</th>
<th>Terrorist Hijack Threat</th>
<th>Suspects Living at Same Address &amp; Phone #</th>
<th>Financial Transactions</th>
<th>VISA Expiration INS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabs in Flight Trng</td>
<td>Aug 13,01</td>
<td>3M/day</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Future Environment Must Support All Types of Data

- Automated Case Files
- Legacy Data Bases
- Local Law Enforcement, Arrest Reports, DMV, Vehicle Registrations, Etc...
- Open Sources & Web Products

- Wiretaps & Surveillance
- Investigative Reports & Evidence...
- Forensics: Blood, Fingerprints, DNA, etc
- Immigration Records
- DEA & ATF Data
- Intelligence Data
- Terrorist Watch Lists

Data from Search Warrants: Bank Records, Credit Card Transactions, Hotel, Airlines, Printed Documents etc.

Data includes: Documents, electronic files, images, audio, Graphics, Multimedia, databases, Web products, etc...

Law Enforcement is an Information Intensive Business
Why Build A Data Warehouse?

A Data Warehouse Allows Us To Store Enterprise Data that We Own and Control to Minimize Cost and Maximize Benefits.

- Gives You Total Knowledge of Everything You Have!
  - Today we do NOT Really Know What we Have or Where It’s At

- Makes Data available to all Applications from one Source
  - Eliminates Stovepipe View of one System at a Time

- Simplifies Migration of Old Obsolete Data Stores & Applications.
  - Reduced Cost of Operations & Maintenance

- Separates Data Access from Applications:
  - Greatly Improves User Access
  - Becomes an Enterprise Service
  - Simplifies & Speeds Up Application Development

- Provides Information Exchange Portals Or Data Marts
  - Simplifies Accessing & Locating Information

- Supports Information Sharing
  - Support Transferring & Combining Data

- Improves Security Access & Control
**Enterprise View of All Your Data**

Users Don't Care Where the Data Is or How it is Stored They Just Want Easy Access

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name: Al-Jiddi, Al Rauf Bin Al Habib Bin Yousef</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationality: Tunisian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race: Arab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height: 5' 9&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifiers: Four inch Scar on left forearm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

St. Address: 437'B Maple St  | City: Montreal |
State: Quebec  | Zip: Country: Canada |
Profession: Civil Engineer | Employer: TPS Shipping |
Education: Cairo University | Spouse: Unknown |

H. Phone: (973) 333-1234 Office Phx (687) 65-6310 Cell Phx (880) 13-1567 |
Pager: (973) 321-1337 | Fax: |
Vehicles: 1998 Honda 4D. Tan |
Affiliations: Al Qaida |

Criminal Background: Suspected Terrorists & Assassin |
Description: Al-Jiddi is believed to have joined the Al Qaida terrorist organization in 1991. He trained in Afghanistan and was believed to have helped plan the USS Cole attack on Oct 12, 2000.

**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED**

**DATE 06-27-2007 BY 63179 DTM/DA/CL**
Information Framework

Presentation Layer

Access Layer

Virtual Layer

Physical Storage Layer

Transport Layer

JAVA Applets WEB BASED APPLICATIONS Legacy Stovepipes

FBI Functional Applications

INTEGRATED DATA WAREHOUSE Using Storage Area Network (SAN)

LEGACY FBI DATA BASES EXTERNAL DATA BASES
Total View – of All Relevant Info via Virtual Knowledge Base (VKB)

Virtual Knowledge Base
A combination of distributed data bases and data warehouses (including external sources you do not own) into a searchable information sphere that can be used for data mining or cross indexing.

Must Develop IDW/VKB
Policy, Guidance & Concept of Operations:

What information do we need?
How does it have to be controlled?
How long do we retain it?
How often do we update it?
Who can see/use it?
What do we share with others?
FBI Interim Architecture
Information Sharing & Collaboration Using the Intelligence Community Model

FBI NET

Do NOT Share With Anyone Else

FBI Data Marts

Limited Sharing Under Special Rules

Share with All Cleared who have a valid need-to-know
Data Mining & Exploitation
Finding unrecognized relationships or correlations between entities.
Goes beyond simple cross indexing or table look ups.
**Data Mining:** Requires new Functions, New Data, New Tools, New Procedures and Additional Personnel
FBI Strategy:

- Provide a Complete, User-friendly, Tailorable Integrated Environment for all users with web-based, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) applications and specialized Government applications, with a single user sign-on that for each security level that support all functions.
- Provide easy access to all authorized data and information without knowing its format, location, or classification (Maintains Need to Know) through a Data Warehouse and Virtual Knowledge Base.
- Provide Rapid delivery and insertion of new COTS technology based on customer feedback, new requirements, commercial developments and annual reevaluations. Test before you buy!
- Provide Automatic Publishing & Dissemination using meta-data and subscription services
- Support Active Collaboration and Data Sharing across Law enforcement, intelligence and with other Agencies.
- User Driven End-state. Only the users can determine if a tool works for them. Need set of interoperable tools. Must have Active User Involvement Driving the Process.

  Capability = Tools + Infrastructure + Training + Trained Users + CONOPS + Management Commitment

- How Do We Make This Happen?
Data Sources in IDW and SPT

Below is a summary of the 12 data sets that are currently in the main IDW as well as the 10 in the TFOS/RRET special access page. The additional 14 other data sets that will shortly be ingested by TFOS/RRET are also detailed below as well as 5 other proposed CTD TFOS/RRET data sets.

IDW

The following data sets and their approximate sizes, as of 06/03/2004, are currently available through the main IDW:

Automated Case System (ACS) Electronic Case File (ECF)
This data set contains copies of approximately 1 ECs, FD-302s, Facsimiles, FD-542s, Inserts, Transcriptions, Teletypes, Letter Head Memorandums (LHM), Memorandums and other FBI documents contained within ACS/ECF for all but the following FBI case classification violations:
The files are updated daily;

Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF)
Lists of individuals and organizations associated with violent gangs and terrorism, provided by the FBI National Crime Information Center (NCIC). This file is updated periodically, usually monthly;

Secure Automated Messaging Network (SAMNet)
SAMNet consists of messaging traffic that is sent between different U.S. Government agencies through the Automated Digital Information Network (AutoDIN), including Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) and Technical Disseminations (TD) from the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and others
These files are updated daily;
Joint Intelligence Committee Investigation (JICI)

Scanned copies of all FBI documents related to extremist Islamic terrorism between 1993 and 2002. These files are not updated;

Open Source News

Various foreign news sources that have been translated into English, as well as a few large U.S. publications, such as the Washington Post. These files are updated daily;
## IDW System

### Data sources currently in IDW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Abbrev.</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Reqmt/Ref.</th>
<th>Class.</th>
<th>Data Filtering Restrictions</th>
<th>Dissemination Restrictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automated Case System/Electronic Case File</td>
<td>ACS/ECF</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td></td>
<td>Secret</td>
<td>Only case classifications required to support intelligence analysis are allowed in IDW; Grand Jury information is also excluded. List of case classifications is available in EC 242-HQ-1139716 (serial 252)</td>
<td>FBI only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File</td>
<td>VGTOF</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sensitive But Unclassified</td>
<td>Only supposed to be used for criminal justice purposes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure Automated Messaging Network-Secret</td>
<td>SAMNet-S</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td></td>
<td>Secret</td>
<td>Exclusively for the use of criminal justice entities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Filtering Restrictions: Only case classifications required to support intelligence analysis are allowed in IDW; Grand Jury information is also excluded. List of case classifications is available in EC 242-HQ-1139716 (serial 252).

Dissemination Restrictions: Only supposed to be used for criminal justice purposes. Exclusively for the use of criminal justice entities.
### IDW System

#### Data sources currently in IDW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Abbrev.</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Reqmt/Ref.</th>
<th>Class.</th>
<th>Data Filtering Restrictions</th>
<th>Dissemination Restrictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Application</td>
<td>TA</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td></td>
<td>Secret</td>
<td>Certain data is restricted by the case agent in the field; think this information should be available to analysts, but need a policy to support this assertion.</td>
<td>FBI only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA IIRs and TDs</td>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>EC 66F-HQ-C1434337 Secret</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passport Fraud data</td>
<td>Dept of State</td>
<td>EC 66F-HQ-C1434337 Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost/Stolen Passport data</td>
<td>Dept of State</td>
<td>EC 66F-HQ-C1434337 Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IntelPlus (additional filerooms)</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>EC 66F-HQ-C1434337 Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>EC 66F-HQ-C1434337 Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>EC 66F-HQ-C1434337 Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>EC 66F-HQ-C1434337 Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>EC 66F-HQ-C1434337 Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## IDW System

### Data sources currently in IDW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Abbrev.</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Reqmt/Ref.</th>
<th>Class.</th>
<th>Data Filtering Restrictions</th>
<th>Dissemination Restrictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automated Case System/Universal Name Index</td>
<td>UNI</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>EC 66F-HQ-C1434337</td>
<td>Secret</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Crime Information Center</td>
<td>NCIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automated Case File/Unified Index</td>
<td>UNI</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>EC 66F-HQ-C1434337</td>
<td>Secret</td>
<td>Only case classifications required to support intelligence analysis will be allowed in IDW.</td>
<td>FBI only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Surveillance</td>
<td>ELSUR</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Screening Center</td>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IDW System

#### Data sources currently in IDW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Abbrev.</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Reqmt/Ref.</th>
<th>Class.</th>
<th>Data Filtering Restrictions</th>
<th>Dissemination Restrictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration and Naturalization</td>
<td>INS</td>
<td>INS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed</td>
<td>Unknown - more analysis needed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 of 4
----- Original Message ----- 
From: (OGC) (FBI) 
Sent: Tuesday, September 28, 2004 9:58 AM 
To: (OGC) (FBI) 
Cc: MILLER, WILLIAM A. (OGC) (FBI) 
Subject: IDW data sources 

UNCLASSIFIED 
NON-RECORD
-----Original Message-----
From: MILLER, WILLIAM A. (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, September 27, 2004 6:36 PM
To:
Cc: KELLEY, PATRICK W. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Information Sharing Policy Group Mtg - 9/28, 2:00, Rm 7846

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

OTHER O/S
---Original Message---

From: (OI) (OGA)
Sent: Friday, September 24, 2004 12:39 PM
To: SZADY, DAVID (CD) (FBI); ASHLEY, GRANT D. (DO) (FBI); AZMI, ZALMAI (OCIO) (FBI); BAGINSKI, MAUREEN A. (DO) (FBI); BAILEY, GREGG D. (ITOD) (FBI); BALD, GARY M. (CTD) (FBI); BROCK, KEVIN R. (OIO) (FBI); Caproni, Valerie E. (OGC) (FBI); FUENTES, THOMAS V. (OIO) (FBI); HOOKS, JOHN S. (CIS) (FBI); HOOTON, WILLIAM L. (RMD) (FBI); MONROE, JANA D. (CyD) (FBI); PHALEN, CHARLES S JR (SecD) (FBI); PISTOLE, JOHN S. (DO) (FBI); QUIJAS, LOUIS F. (DO) (FBI); SOLOMON, JONATHAN I. (DO) (FBI); SWECKER, CHRIS (CID) (FBI)
Cc: TANNER, MARK A. (DO) (FBI); GRIGG, G CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI); ITOD) (FBI); (OI) (CON); ALLEN, MARIE B. (RMD) (FBI); CD) (FBI); (OI) (FBI); (OIO) (FBI); (ITOD) (FBI); CD) (FBI); CASEY, ROBERT E. JR (OIO) (FBI); FEDARCYK, MICHAEL R. (CTD) (FBI); (ITOD) (FBI); ME) (FBI); (OIO) (FBI); (SA) (FBI); CHASE, WILLIAM D (AL) (FBI); SecD) (FBI); HALL, DEAN E. (SecD) (FBI); HENDERSHOT, HAROLD M. (RMD) (FBI); (DO) (FBI); KELLEY, PATRICK W. (OGC) (FBI); (DO) (FBI); (CID) (FBI); LEWIS, JOSEPH R. (CID) (FBI); (CID) (FBI); (CIJS) (FBI); (CID) (FBI); MILLER, WILLIAM A. (OGC) (FBI); (CTD) (FBI); (SecD) (OAG); (OGC) (FBI); (CD) (FBI); (DO) (FBI); (OI) (CON); (DO) (FBI); VAN DUYN, DONALD N. (CTD) (FBI); (DO) (FBI)

Subject: Information Sharing Policy Group Mtg - 9/28, 2:00, Rm 7846

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

The Information Sharing Policy Group meets on Tuesday, Sept 28, at 2:00-3:00 in Rm 7846. Attached are:

9/28/2004
-----Original Message-----
From: TANNER, MARK A.
Sent: Monday, August 09, 2004 4:12 PM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI); BAILEY, GREGG D. (ITOD)(FBI);
Cc: PISTOLE, JOHN S. (DO) (FBI); FEDARCYK, MICHAEL R. (CTD) (FBI); HARRINGTON, T J. (CTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: ACCESS TO VISIT

Mark A. Tanner
Director of the
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
703-418-1111

-----Original Message-----
From: [REDACTED] (DO)(FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 09, 2004 3:22 PM
To: BAILEY, GREGG D. (ITOD)(FBI) (CJIS) (FBI); TANNER, MARK A.
Cc: PISTOLE, JOHN S. (DO) (FBI); FEDARCYK, MICHAEL R. (CTD) (FBI)
Subject: ACCESS TO VISIT
From: OGC)(FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2004 2:41 PM  
To: OGC)(FBI); GRIGG, G CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI); CAPIANO (IRD) (FBI); Caproni, Valerie E. (OGC) (FBI); BAGINSKI, MAUREEN A. (DO) (FBI)  
Cc: KELLEY, PATRICK W. (OGC) (FBI); MILLER, WILLIAM A. (OGC) (FBI); OGC) (FBI); CURRAN, John F. (OGC) (OGA)  
Subject: FinCEN data for IDW

All information contained herein is unclassified.

8/3/2004
From: [PMO] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, July 15, 2004 4:32 PM
To: [PMO] (FBI)
Subject: RE: IDW Presentation

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

-----Original Message-----
From: [PMO] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, July 15, 2004 4:10 PM
To: [PMO] (FBI)
Subject: IDW Presentation

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

-----Original Message-----
From: [PMO] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 8:11 AM
To: [PMO] (FBI)
Cc: RITCHHART, KENNETH MICHAEL (IRD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: IDW Presentation

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

-----Original Message-----
From: [PMO] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2004 8:26 AM
To: Curran, John F. (OGC) (FBI); MILLER, WILLIAM A. (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: KELLEY, PATRICK W. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: FW: IDW Presentation

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD
-----Original Message-----
From: [OCA] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, February 18, 2005 2:45 PM
To: [OGC] (FBI); MILLER, WILLIAM A. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Review of Proposed Response re: Data Mining

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD
From: OGC (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 11:52 AM  
To: OGC (FBI)  
Subject: FW: Tentative meeting next week

SECRRT  
RECORD 319X-HQ-xxxx

FYI - thought you might want to come to the meeting.

OGC colleagues:

NSB Executive Staff Section

-----Original Message-----
From: (O) (O)G  
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 11:24 AM  
To: OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI); OGC (FBI)  
Cc: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI); VAN DUYN, DONALD N. (CTD) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Tentative meeting next week

SECRRT  
RECORD 319X-HQ-xxxx

It works for me and I would like to attend.

Assistant General Counsel
OGC colleagues:

NSB Executive Staff Section

-----Original Message-----
From: (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 11:04 AM
To: (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Tentative meeting next week

It works for me and I would like to attend.

Assistant General Counsel  
Privacy and Civil Liberties Unit, Room 7338  
202-324- (voice)  
202-324- (facsimile)

PRIVILEGED DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT - NOT FOR DISCLOSURE OUTSIDE THE FBI WITHOUT PRIOR OGC APPROVAL
OGC colleagues:

I will try to attend.

NSB Executive Staff Section

---Original Message---
From: [OGC] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 11:04 AM
To: [OGC] (FBI); [OGC] (FBI); [OGC] (FBI)
Cc: [OGC] (FBI); [OGC] (FBI); [OGC] (FBI)
Subject: RE: Tentative meeting next week

It works for me and I would like to attend.

Assistant General Counsel
Privacy and Civil Liberties Unit, Room 7338
202-324 (voice)
202-324 (facsimile)

PRIVILEGED DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT - NOT FOR DISCLOSURE OUTSIDE THE FBI WITHOUT PRIOR OGC APPROVAL

---Original Message---
From: [OGC] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 10:55 AM
To: [OGC] (FBI); [OGC] (FBI); [OGC] (FBI);
Cc: [OGC] (FBI); [OGC] (FBI); [OGC] (FBI)
Subject: RE: Tentative meeting next week

To the extent possible - does that work for everyone who wants to attend?
can you try to have this on Thurs next week?
Good points. We do receive updates for some of the data sets which give us instructions as to which to add, modify or delete. As far as accuracy some are corrected in this way while others are not. For example, if a foreign national provides inaccurate or untrue information on the I-94 card they fill out as their plane is landing in the US, neither DHS or us can control that. The information is put on the card by them, retyped into a database verbatim by DHS and shared with us. That is an example of a potential inaccurate or untrue record that would not be corrected.

In contrast however, another record that we get that could be corrected is an ACS or UNI record. One week we may get a dump from ACS. The next week they may send a correction notice to remove duplicate documents, correct a case ID, etc. These would be handled accordingly. The same happens with data from FinCEN and others. If for example some intel agency writes a cable on SAMNET and we ingest it today, then later they debunk the source, they will issue a new cable taking back the claim on the old cable. But the original cable remains as a matter of record and the new one stands as a correction to the original. The problem is both simple and complex to describe and address.

Our intention and goal is to model as best as possible the records contained in the primary system. Therefore, if the primary system allows for updates or changes to the record then we will reflect the change. In this way we most resemble a mirror and the central burden remains on the primary system.

G. Clayton Grigg
Acting Director
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
Counterterrorism Division (CTD)

---Original Message---
UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

--- Original Message ---

From: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 1:04 PM
To: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)
Cc: OGC) (FBI); MILLER, WILLIAM A. (OGC) (FBI); KELLEY, PATRICK W.
Subject: UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

Assistant General Counsel
Privacy and Civil Liberties Unit, Room 7338
202-324 (voice)
202-324 (facsimile)

PRIVILEGED DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT - NOT FOR DISCLOSURE OUTSIDE THE FBI WITHOUT PRIOR
OGC APPROVAL

--- Original Message ---

From: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 11:15 AM
To: KELLEY, PATRICK W. (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: HARRINGTON, T. J. (CTD) (FBI)
Subject: UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD
G. Clayton Grigg
Acting Director
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
Counterterrorism Division (CTD)

(703) 553-2625 (Office)
(202) 256-6262 (Cell/Blackberry)
(877) 270-1234 (Pager)

(Blackberry UNCLASS)
For more additional information you can also contact: The basic process works like this:

1. An operational division, unit or group identifies a need for a particular data source
2. Requirements are gathered regarding the data source (i.e. Data source description, operational need, data type, location, size, classification, etc.)
3. The data source is nominated for future consideration by the Information Sharing Policy Board (ISPB)
4. Before the ISPB rules on the data source it is reviewed by the OGC, Security, etc. and a Privacy Impact Assessment is completed
5. Any issues identified by this review are addressed and if they are correctable and then the data source is proposed to the ISPB for approval
6. The ISPB then reviews the findings by OGC, Security, etc. and either approves or disapproves the new source
7. Once approval is obtained the data will be ingested.

I would like to review what you draft before your reply if possible.

NOTE: It should be noted that even before a data source arrives at the ISPB for review by OGC, Security, etc. an extensive requirements gathering process is conducted. This involves meeting with the original data source owner (if from another agency then this involves inter-agency meetings, sometimes Memorandum of Understandings as occurred with FinCEN). Additionally, the idea is often run by OGC even before presented to ensure the proper requirements are gathered. Another concern and item to keep in mind is the resources and technical capacity to absorb a data source.

There are a number of decisional tradeoffs that factor into what data source is acquired in what order.

G. Clayton Grigg
Acting Director
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
Counterterrorism Division (CTD)

(703) 553-7979 (Office)
(202) 262-8010 (Cell/Blackberry)
(877) 270-1234 (Pager)

---Original Message---

From: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 5:18 PM
To: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Query regarding IDW

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

Mr. Grigg,
I am aware of the letter and have read it. By way of background, I do not have any correspondence or documents from other agencies that have refused to contribute information to the system or demonstrate unwillingness. To the contrary we have received great support. Of those that I have coordinated and gone after, we have received cooperation.

Additionally, for every new data source approvals, suitability reviews, Privacy Impact Assessments, etc. must be obtained and concurred with from entities like OGC, the Information Sharing Policy Board, Security, prior to ingestion of any new data. UC of TFOS could probably add to this.

The situation with the IDW is that all available data that we had resources for, deemed most operationally critical and/or had ready access to has been pursued or proposed. The program has not been limited by unwillingness to share. In my estimation the cooperation has been unprecedented and is one of the program’s most profound successes. The amount of data in the system has experienced a 27x growth factor in the last 2 1/2 years and 34x in the number of accounts. Utilization across all program lines is growing and 1000s of accounts have been created for non-FBI users. The system went from 12 collections to 53 data sets. Because of its success demand has significantly outpaced resources and capacity. This has caused the IDW in concert with CTD to manage these changes and mitigate the risks imposed by this resource constrained environment. Of IDW is compiling the list of databases in IDW.

G. Clayton Grigg
Acting Director
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
Counterterrorism Division (CTD)

(703) 553 (Office)
(202) 262 (Cell/Blackberry)
(877) 270 (Pager)
(Blackberry UNCLASS)

---Original Message---
From: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI) (703) 553 (Office) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 1:16 PM
To: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)
Subject: Query regarding IDW

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

Mr. Grigg,

I am an agent in Congressional Affairs, with responsibility for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Senator Charles Grassley(R-IA) is a member of the committee. The attached letter from Senator Grassley requests information regarding sources for the records contained in IDW. Specifically, Grassley wants to know what agencies are not participating in IDW.

Please take a look at the letter, and give me a call to educate me on the process.

Thanks.

<< File: grassley incoming re IDW.pdf >>
From: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 9:10 AM
To: MILLER, WILLIAM A. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Query regarding IDW

FYI below re: IDW from Senator Grassley.

G. Clayton Grigg  
Acting Director  
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)  
Counterterrorism Division (CTD)

(Office)  
(202) 262-  
(877) 270-  
(Office/Blackberry)  
(Office/Blackberry UNCLASS)

From: DO (FBI)
Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 1:16 PM
To: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)
Subject: Query regarding IDW

Mr. Grigg,

I'm an agent in Congressional Affairs, with responsibility for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Senator Charles Grassley(R-IA) is a member of the committee. The attached letter from Senator Grassley requests information regarding sources for the records contained in IDW. Specifically, Grassley wants to know what agencies are not participating in IDW.

Please take a look at the letter, and give me a call to educate me on the process.

Thanks
Good points. We do receive updates for some of the data sets which give us instructions as to which to add, modify or delete. As far as accuracy some are corrected in this way while others are not. For example, if a foreign national provides inaccurate or untrue information on the I-94 card they fill out as their plane is landing in the US, neither DHS or us can control that. The information is put on the card by them, retyped into a database verbatim by DHS and shared with us. That is an example of a potential inaccurate or untrue record that would not be corrected.

In contrast however, another record that we get that could be corrected is an ACS or UNI record. One week we may get a dump from ACS. The next week they may send a correction notice to remove duplicate documents, correct a case ID, etc. These would be handled accordingly. The same happens with data from FinCEN and others. If for example some intel agency writes a cable on SAMNET and we ingest it today, then later they debunk the source, they will issue a new cable taking back the claim on the old cable. But the original cable remains as a matter of record and the new one stands as a correction to the original. The problem is both simple and complex to describe and address.

Our intention and goal is to model as best as possible the records contained in the primary system. Therefore, if the primary system allows for updates or changes to the record then we will reflect the change. In this way we most resemble a mirror and the central burden remains on the primary system.

G. Clayton Grigg
Acting Director
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
Counterterrorism Division (CTD)

-----Original Message-----
One of the questions today by the President's Civil Liberties Board (PCLB), particularly that of Lannie Davis...
One of the questions today by the President's Civil Liberties Board (PCLB), particularly that of Lannie Davis, focused on how and if users are able to nominate documents containing inaccurate information for removal and/or notify other users of their observations regarding a particular document. What we are talking about in simple terms is "digital sticky notes" and comments that can be attached or associated with a document that other users can review. This can also be used to facilitate and promote collaboration between users. At the bottom of the FD-302 we find the words, "The document contains neither recommendations or conclusions of the FBI." ECs, cables, etc. have no such caveats.

One issue is that the IDW, like the FTTTF data mart, are not systems of records merely aggregate custodians of other records. An as such do not contain "original" records not found elsewhere.

For some time now on the IDW system, we have been collecting the users willingness to "collaborate" their query results with others who may have similar interest. Currently, the only ones we export and share per MOU is when they access Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) documents.
G. Clayton Grigg
Acting Director
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
Counterterrorism Division (CTD)

(703) 553 (Office)
(202) 262 (Cell/Blackberry)
(877) 270 (Pager)
(Blackberry UNCLASS)

UNCLASSIFIED
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 03-27-2007 BY 65179 DMH/BJA/CAL

---Original Message---

From: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 11:15 AM
To: KELLEY, PATRICK W. (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: HARRINGTON, T. J. (CTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE:

---Original Message---

From: (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 1:04 PM
To: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)
Cc: KELLEY, PATRICK W. (OGC) (FBI); MILLER, WILLIAM A. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE:
One of the questions today by the President's Civil Liberties Board (PCLB), particularly that of Lannie Davis, focused on how and if users are able to nominate documents containing inaccurate information for removal and/or notify other users of their observations regarding a particular document. What we are talking about in simple terms is "digital sticky notes" and comments that can be attached or associated with a document that other users can review. This can also be used to facilitate and promote collaboration between users. At the bottom of the FD-302 we find the words, "The document contains neither recommendations or conclusions of the FBI." ECs, cables, etc. have no such caveats.

One issue is that the IDW, like the FTTTF data mart, are not systems of records merely aggregate custodians of other records. As such do not contain "original" records not found elsewhere.

G. Clayton Grigg
Acting Director
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
Counterterrorism Division (CTD)

(703) 553-6161 (Office)
(202) 262-4410 (Cell/Blackberry)
(877) 270-4000 (Pager)
From: (ITSD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, September 07, 2006 11:35 AM
To: (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: KELLEY, PATRICK W. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: IDW PIAs

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

We have essentially 54 databases under IDW. I think they represent 54 data sources or a somewhat smaller subset. 75% of the data sources in IDW come from outside agencies. 25% is from the FBI.

---Original Message---
From: (ITSD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, September 07, 2006 11:26 AM
To: (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: KELLEY, PATRICK W. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: IDW PIAs

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

---Original Message---
From: (ITSD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 31, 2006 7:51 AM
To: (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: IDW PIAs

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

---Original Message---
From: (ITSD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 30, 2006 4:35 PM
To: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)
Cc: MILLER, WILLIAM A. (OGC) (FBI); KELLEY, PATRICK W. (OGC) (FBI); AZMI, ZALMAI (DO) (FBI)
Subject: IDW PIAs

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 08-27-2007 BY 65179 DMH/BJA/CAL
From: OGC (FBI)
Sent: Monday, May 15, 2006 4:23 PM
To: OGC (FBI); BOWMAN, MARION
Cc: OGC (FBI)
Subject: FW: IDW Meeting w/NCTC

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

Assistant General Counsel
Policy & Training Unit
National Security Law Branch
(202) 324-
Here are the minutes of the IDW meeting and the IDW presentation.

--- Original Message ---
From:  (O1) (FBI)  
Sent:  Friday, May 12, 2006 4:32 PM  
To:  (O1) (FBI); GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CID) (FBI); BOWMAN, MARION E. (O1) (FBI);  
Subject:  RE: IDW Meeting w/NCTC  

UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD  

The following Role Base Access has been established for the OGA Federal Employees and Contractors which fall into these categories of individuals: Supervisors and Analysts. These individuals have the following accesses: Unrestricted Universal Index Search, 164 Crime Abroad Aircraft, 174 Bombing Matters, 199 International Terrorism (Old), 262 Overseas Homicide/Attempted Homicide, 265 Acts of Terrorism (Old), 266 Acts of Terrorism/Domestic Terrorism, 279 WMD, 294 Infrastructure Protection, 300 CT Preparedness and 315 International
Terrorism Investigations.

Original Message

From: [Email Address]
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 3:27 PM
To: [Email Address]
Subject: FW: IDW Meeting w/NCTC

UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD

I believe non FBI only have access to 315 files, can you clarify this?

Supervisory Special Agent
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
Group Chief, Counterintelligence Group

Original Message

From: [Email Address]
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 3:25 PM
To: [Email Address], [Email Address]
Subject: RE: IDW Meeting w/NCTC

UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD

The more important question is who has access to unrestricted ACS case files (315 or wider), which are in IDW.

Original Message

From: [Email Address]
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 3:19 PM
To: [Email Address], [Email Address]
Subject: IDW Meeting w/NCTC

UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD

Just to follow up on the FBINET access to non-FBI personnel assigned to NCTC:

400 OGA personnel have access to FBINET at NCTC, of which 289 are OGA Fed Employees and 111 OGA Contractors.

In addition to these numbers, there are currently 56 FBI personnel assigned to NCTC.
which fall into these categories of individuals: Supervisors and Analysts. These individuals have the following
accesses: Unrestricted Universal Index Search, 164 Crime Abroad Aircraft, 174 Bombing Matters, 199 International
Terrorism (Old), 262 Overseas Homicide/Attempted Homicide, 265 Acts of Terrorism (Old), 266 Acts of
Terrorism/Domestic Terrorism, 279 WMD, 294 Infrastructure Protection, 300 CT Preparedness and 315 International
Terrorism Investigations.

---Original Message---
From: OI (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 3:27 PM
To: (SecD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: IDW Meeting w/NCTC

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

Roger, I believe non FBI only have access to 315 files, can you clarify this?

Supervisory Special Agent
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
Group Chief, Counterintelligence Group

---Original Message---
From: OI (OGA)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 3:25 PM
To: OI (FBI); GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CID) (FBI); BOWMAN, MARION E. (OI) (FBI)
Subject: RE: IDW Meeting w/NCTC

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

The more important question is who has access to unrestricted ACS case files (315 or wider), which are in IDW.

---Original Message---
From: OI (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 3:19 PM
To: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CID) (FBI); OI (OGA); BOWMAN, MARION E. (OI) (FBI)
Subject: IDW Meeting w/NCTC

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

Just to follow up on the FBINET access to non-FBI personnel assigned to NCTC:

400 OGA personnel have access to FBINET at NCTC, of which 289 are OGA Fed Employees and 111 OGA
Contractors.

In addition to these numbers, there are currently 56 FBI personnel assigned to NCTC.

Supervisory Special Agent
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
Group Chief, Counterintelligence Group
I have been appointed as the Acting Director/Section Chief for the FTTTF. However, I still retain involvement in the IDW and work with the IDW Program Manager SSA is now the Acting Unit Chief of my old unit and will be involved in the below effort along with I will forward your message to him and provide him with the necessary background information to be given to you.

Also has completed an EC from the IDW detailing how they have been complying with the previous PIA requirements. He and I understood this as necessary BEFORE considering adding any new data.

Look forward to working with you on this. Happy New Year!

G. Clayton Grigg
Acting Director
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
Counterterrorism Division (CTD)

---Original Message---
From: OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 29, 2005 1:39 PM
To: GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)
Subject: IDW

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

THIS IS A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND IS NOT TO BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED WITHOUT PRIOR OGC APPROVAL.
---Original Message---

From: TANNER, MARK A. (CTD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 8:16 AM
To: [Local Recipients]
Cc: [Local Recipients]
Subject: FW: RECORD 64E-NY-C289829

SECRET

I forgot to CC ya'll on this.

Mark A. Tanner
Director of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force

---Original Message---

From: TANNER, MARK A. (CTD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 8:16 AM
To: [Local Recipients]
Cc: [Local Recipients]
Subject: FW: RECORD 64E-NY-C289829

SECRET

Mark A. Tanner
Director of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force

---Original Message---

From: TANNER, MARK A. (CTD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 7:39 AM
To: [Local Recipients]
Cc: [Local Recipients]
Subject: RE: RECORD 64E-NY-C289829

SECRET

11/6/2006
From: MILLER, WILLIAM A. (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2005 9:17 AM
To: (OGC) (FBI)

Subject: MILLER, WILLIAM A. (OGC) (FBI)

FYI in case pertinent to stuff you may do (PIA, MOU)

This is the issue re the email you sent to Exec Sec.

Assistant General Counsel
Policy & Training Unit
National Security Law Branch
(202) 324

Background, status and a couple of comments...
Mr. Henry,

Spike Bowman suggested that Valerie Calogero (an attorney in my unit) brief you on an issue that NSLB has been involved with to see whether Exec Sec staff may want to handle this or assign it elsewhere.

DHS has recently prepared a White Paper on the Security Advisory (SAO) Process, which addresses

(1) creating an SAO governance board, and